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Lieutenant commanders (LCDRs) attending the Naval Postgraduate
School were surveyed on their perceptions of three voluntary
separation plans, Special Separation Benefit (SSB), Voluntary
Separation Incentive (VSI) and 15-year early retirement. Additionally,
several factors were studied to identify their relationship to the
likelihood of accepting one of the plans. Survey results indicate
that: 1) LCDRs are a career oriented group who plan to remain in the
Navy at least until eligible for a 20-year retirement, 2) there is
little probability that LCDRs would accept SSB or VSI if given the
choice, 3) the majority of LCDRs (60 percent) expressed some
likelihood of accepting 15-year early retirement if given the
opportunity, 4) full retirement benefits and lifetime monthly income
were the most important factors considered when ranking the three
plans in order of their likelihood of acceptance, and 5) availability of
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Early retirement programs and severance packages are
being used extensively in organizations throughout the
United States in order to reduce workforce size and
personnel costs Large companies such as IBM, AT&T, General
Motors and Chrysler, state and local governments, and the
federal civil service have announced plans for reducing
their organization size through early retirement or
severance plans.
The military is no exception to this trend of making
organizations "lean and mean." Congress recently approved a
package of early-out incentives for service members in
overpopulated skills who agree to leave active duty prior to
retirement eligibility However, this package was developed
using a 1 00 , 000-per-year reduction of the active duty forces
from 1991 to 1995, a number most services could accommodate
through normal attrition, with only minimal involuntary
separations Although it is not clear how severe additional
force reductions will be, most agree that active duty forces
will face far greater reductions than originally planned
Early reports on acceptance of the voluntary separation
incentives have baffled financial experts Service members
who want to leave are choosing the lump sum benefit, special
separation benefit (SSB), over the annuity, voluntary
1
separation incentive (VSI), "by margins of six to one in the
Air Force and Marine Corps, and four to one in the Army and
Navy " CRef . lip. 3D This is despite the fact that the
present value of VSI's annual payments is higher than that
of the lump sum benefit Additionally, those opting for the
lump sum stand to lose 28 percent of the benefit immediately
to income taxes, while those choosing to receive the annuity
are only taxed on payments as they are received annually
This suggests there may be more factors then just financial
ones influencing this decision to accept a separation
incentive
.
If the military drawdown must be accelerated, which it
is becoming more evident that it will, the present early-out
plans may not provide adequate incentives to meet a larger
force reduction (particularly of service members with over
15 years of service). The chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, Senator Sam Nunn, has recently proposed
a 15-year retirement plan to ease the pain of the drawdown
This further complicates the decision-making process of
individuals already faced with the choice of accepting VSI
or SSB—should they hold out for a 15-year retirement plan,
or will they end up being involuntarily separated through a
reduction in force (RIF) if they delay 7
A . PURPOSE
The purpose of this study is to survey and analyze
lieutenant commanders' perceptions concerning voluntary
separation plans and factors that influence the decision to
accept a separation incentive, either Voluntary Separation
Incentive <VSI ) , Special Separation Benefit (SSB) or 15-year
retirement. Service members who eventually decide to accept
one of these incentives and leave the military must base
their decision on some factors that support that decision.
It would be helpful to know what these factors are as well
as how they affect the decision to accept an incentive
This research will attempt to identify factors that affect
this decision process and explore their interactions.
Specifically, this thesis attempts to study the decision
process to accept a separation incentive using Navy
lieutenant commanders attending the Naval Postgraduate
School. Multivariate analysis and correlation of variables
identified based on previous research as well as original
assumptions are used to model the separation incentive
decision' against measures of career intent, monetary
separation incentives, non-monetary separation benefits,
perceived ease of finding a comparable civilian job,
possibility of a RIF, tenure and spousal support.
B. DEFINITIONS
The three separation plans used in this study are
defined as follows:
1 . Special Separation Benefit (SSB)
This separation benefit is a lump sum equal to 15
percent of annual base pay multiplied by years of service.
This option gives separating members the same transition
benefits as those given to members involuntarily separated,
i.e. four months medical coverage, 24 months commissary
privileges, job counseling and placement assistance, and
permission to remain in government family housing for up to
two months after separation. The lump sum is taxable as
regular income in the year it is received. Presently, a
minimum of six years active duty service is needed to
qualify for this benefit. CRef . 2:p. 14]
2. Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI )
This incentive offers an immediate annuity equal to
2.5 percent of annual base pay multiplied by years of
service. The annual payments continue for twice the number
of years the member has served on active duty These
payments are not adjusted for inflation. A minimum of six
years active duty service is presently needed to qualify for
this incentive. There are no transitional benefits. CRef
2:p 14]
3. 15—Year Retirement
This plan offers an immediate annuity using the same
formula as traditional retirement pay, i.e. 2.5 percent of
annual base pay multiplied by years of service. Monthly
payments continue for the member's lifetime and are adjusted
annually for inflation similar to present retirement pay.
Service members receive the same benefits as with 20-year
retirement (medical care, commissary and exchange
privileges, etc ) . A minimum of 15 years active duty
service would be needed to qualify. Presently this plan is
only in the proposal stage in Congress. CRef . 3:p. 33
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This introduction presents background of the problem,
objectives and purpose of the analysis, and thesis
organization. The next chapter presents the hypotheses as
they were derived from a review of the literature. The
third chapter, research methodology, describes the sample
surveyed, measures used in survey development and
demographics. The fourth chapter presents responses from
the survey and provides hypothesis testing results. The
fifth chapter provides an analysis of results with regard to
the literature, and the final chapter summarizes findings
and conclusions
II. LITERATURE REVIEU AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
A. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Review of the literature revealed many similarities
between the decision to voluntarily leave an organization
(turnover) and the decision to retire early. Retirement
from the military after a 20 year career has some semblance
of early retirement from industry. However, military
officers are in their early forties after completing a 20
year career and can easily start a second non-military
career. Thus there are marked differences between
retirement decision of those in the military and those in
civilian settings. In a study of the Navy career transition
cycle, Bruce (1991) explains that "retirement from the Navy
resembles 'retirement', 'early retirement', and
'resignation' in industry settings." CRef . 4:p. 49] It is
ambiguous whether factors affecting the decision to accept a
separation incentive and leave the military are more closely
related to those affecting turnover decision or early
retirement and retirement decisions. Since both civilian
and military literature differentiate between factors
predicting voluntary turnover /retention and early
retirement/retirement behaviors, this review of the
literature has been similarly organized.
1 Turnover and Retention Literature
The Navy Personnel Research and Development Center
conducted a research program from 1981 to 1989 focusing on
unrestricted line officer career development and management
issues. A longitudinal database containing over 500
questionnaire variables related to retention and career
development and management issues was established, using
data collected in both FY82 and FY86/87 Since the aviation
community was experiencing retention problems, one research
goal was to assist the Navy in attempting to predict which
aviators would stay in the Navy and which would leave.
In order to obtain up-to-date information on which
variables could best predict retention and turnover
behavior, and to identify variables to be included in their
study of factors influencing aviator retention, a literature
review that compared results of civilian and military
literature on retention and turnover was conducted by
Wilcove and Burch (1991) They suggested the following




personality characteristics; interest • inventory
scores; job challenge; supervisory style (considerate
versus authoritarian); spousal support; organizational
characteristics and practices; pay and promotional
opportunities; availability of attractive civilian jobs;
measures of job satisfaction, organizational commitment,
and met expectations; and the intention to stay or leave
an organization CRef 5:p. 5]
A separate study by Burch, Sheposh and Morrison
(1991) attempted to identify factors leading to surface
warfare officer (SUO) retention using data extracted from a
sample of SUOs who participated in the FY86 officer career
development survey conducted by the Navy Personnel Research
and Development Center. Utilizing the Steers and Mowday
(1981) model of employee turnover as the framework, they
tested a hypothesized model of SWO retention (using path
analysis) which identified a combination of ten individual,
organizational and environmental factors as turnover
determinants
.
The results of the analyses indicated the variables
having the strongest zero-order relationship to retention
were stated career intent, intention to search, spousal
support and tenure. Organizational commitment, spousal
support and tenure were found to be significant predictors
of career intent, accounting for 29 percent of the variance
CRef. 6:p. 153
Based on review of turnover literature, several
variables were chosen to study as possible determinants of
the likelihood of accepting a voluntary separation
incentive These include career intent, spousal support,
perceived availability of comparable civilian jobs and
tenure (years of active duty service)
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2. Retirement and Early Retirement Literature
Quinn, Burkhauser and Myers (1990) conducted a
review of literature focusing on economic determinants of
the individual retirement decision within a public policy
framework CRef 7:p. 41-753. They found that early research
showed age and poor health as the most common reasons given
for retirement Financial incentives were rarely considered
to be important determinants of the decision to retire, and
the thought that income sources might induce retirement was
generally dismissed. More recent research findings indicate
factors such as health, job characteristics and involuntary
terminations, i.e. threat of layoffs or age mandated
retirement, are still important but are usually analyzed in
conjunction with the financial tradeoffs between loss of
regular income and Social Security and/or employer pensions
CRef 7:p 423
Gotz and McCall (1983), in their study of retirement
incentives for US Air Force officers in the current
retirement system, concluded:
. .
the common conception that retirement pay is an
overwhelming inducement for officers beyond the tenth
year of service to remain in the Air Force appears to be
correct CRef 8:p. 3423
Lozier and Dooris (1991 ), in a study to identify the
potential influence of 18 factors on faculty members'
decisions to retire, found "the two most salient factors
emerging from the responses were overall financial status
and eligibility for full retirement benefits . " CRef S : p
102] Desirability of more personal / f ami ly time, other
interests and working conditions/policies ranked third,
fourth and fifth respectively. They concluded:
Because of the importance of individual financial status
upon the retirement decision, financial inducements are
probably the most powerful tool for influencing that
decision. CRef 9:p. 105]
Based on review of the early retirement/retirement
literature, several factors relating to overall financial
status and perception of future economic wellbeing were
chosen for study. These include the importance of non-
monetary benefits, monetary incentive plans, and the
probability of involuntary separation through a reduction in
force (RIF)
B. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
A combination of variables derived from the literature
on turnover/retention and early retirement/retirement was
used for this study of lieutenant commanders' likelihood of
accepting a separation incentive when given the choice of
three voluntary separation plans: Voluntary Separation
Incentive (VSI), Special Separation Benefit (SSB), and 15-
Year Retirement The dependent variable was the likelihood
of accepting an incentive plan (thus, voluntarily leaving
the Navy) The following independent variables were used:
monetary separation incentives (VSI, SSB, 15-year
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retirement), non-monetary separation benefits, possibility
of reduction in force (RIF), perceived ease of obtaining a
comparable civilian job, tenure and spousal support The
hypothesized model is presented in Figure 1
Tenure > Likelihood
Spousal support towards career > of
Monetary separation incentives > Accepting
Non-monetary separation benefits —
>
Voluntary
Possibility of involuntary RIF > Separation
Ease of obtaining civilian job > Incentive
Career intent >
Figure 1 . Hypothesized model
The following hypotheses were developed to provide the
basis for survey construction:
1 . Hypothesis 1 : Years of Active Duty Service (Tenure)
Tenure is negatively related to the likelihood of
accepting an incentive and leaving the organization (the
more years of service, the less likely to accept) Although
civilian literature consistently supports this, no military
studies were found specifically examining the relationship
between tenure and turnover CRef 5:p. A-4] However, since
fewer than three percent of Air Force majors voluntarily
resign during the "teen" years of service due to the
1 1
strength of the "carrot" of retirement pay CRef 8:p 342],
it can be inferred that the same relationship between tenure
and turnover that was present in the civilian literature may
exist in a military setting. Therefore, it is expected that
the more years lieutenant commanders have served on active
duty, the less likely they would be to accept a voluntary
separation incentive
2. Hypothesis 2: Spousal Support
Spousal support is negatively related to the
likelihood of accepting an incentive and leaving the Navy
(the more supportive the spouse toward a Navy career, the
less likely to accept). The research consistently shows
that spousal support (a spouse's support or lack of support
for their mate's career) is a strong correlate of the
continuance decision CRef. 5:p. A-15].
3. Hypothesis 3: Monetary Separation Incentives
Monetary separation incentives are positively
related to the likelihood of accepting an incentive and
leaving the Navy (the greater the monetary incentive, the
more likely to accept). Civilian and military researchers
agree that pecuniary variables (pay, allowances, bonuses)
are important considerations in determining whether to leave'
an organization CRef. 5:p. A-22D . Since the three monetary
separation 'incentives (VSI , SSB and 15-year retirement) vary
in their present value, with the 15-year retirement having
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the greatest present value and SSB having the lowest, it is
expected the 15-year retirement will show a greater
likelihood of acceptance than the other two alternatives.
The current preference of enlisted servi cemembers who have
chosen the lump sum (SSB) over the annuity (VSI ) by a four
to one margin could lend support to this hypothesis; they
may perceive the monetary value of the lump sum as being
greater because it is a larger sum of money in their hand
"now", a sum with which to pay off debts and use for living
expenses while they find a new job. To those individuals,
the monetary "value" of the lump sum may truly be greater
than that of the annuity. Without financial counseling, few
enlisted servi cemembers may be aware of either the tax
consequences of accepting the lump sum or the concept of
present value.
4. Hypothesis 4: Non-monetary Separation Benefits
The importance of non-monetary separation benefits
is negatively related to the likelihood of accepting an
incentive and leaving the Navy (the more important non-
monetary benefits are, the less likely to accept) Most
researchers agree that nonpecuniary factors, like monetary
factors, are important in the turnover decision In this
study, these non-monetary benefits include post-separation
benefits such as health care, commissary and exchange
privileges, pre-separation counseling, employment
13
assistance, permissive leave for job search, and
transitional use of military family housing. Since neither
VSI nor SSB offers full retirement benefits, a negative
relationship is expected between importance of benefits and
likelihood of acceptance of VSI or SSB. However, since the
15-year retirement plan does include full retirement
benefits, it is possible there could be a positive
correlation between importance of benefits and likelihood of
acceptance of the early retirement plan. Overall, though,
it is expected that the perception that the decreased
monetary benefit of the 15-year retirement plan will be
equated to a decrease in overall benefits, leading to a
negative relationship between importance of benefits and the
likelihood of accepting a separation incentive.
5. Hypothesis 5: Possibility of Reduction in Force
The possibility of an involuntary reduction in force
CRIF) is positively related to the likelihood of accepting
an incentive and leaving the organization (the greater the
possibility of RIF, the more likely to accept). In a study
which applied a pension acceptance model to acceptance of an
early retirement pension bonus, Hogarth (1988) found that
the worker's perception of facing a layoff created the
largest increase in the probability of accepting a
retirement incentive CRef 10:p 28]
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6. Hypothesis 6: Perceived Ease of Obtaining
Comparable Civilian Employment
The perceived ease of obtaining a comparable
civilian job is positively related to the likelihood of
accepting an incentive and leaving the Navy (the greater the
perceived ease, the more likely to accept) Uilcove and
Burch (1991) found several military personnel studies which
suggest that perceived job alternatives and a person's
perception of their own marketability are important
considerations in the turnover decision CRef . 5:p A-24]
7. Hypothesis 7: Career Intent
Career intent is negatively related to the
likelihood of accepting an incentive and leaving the
organization (the greater the career intent, the less likely
to accept) Uilcove and Burch state that "intention to
leave was consistently found in the military literature to
correlate significantly with actual behavior" CRef. 5:p A-
301. In the Burch et . al surface warfare retention model,
stated career intent had the strongest relationship with
retention CRef 6:p 63, as was the case in a 1989 study by
Bruce and Burch investigating factors leading to naval




Data were collected from a convenience sample consisting
of active duty naval officers with the rank of lieutenant
commander attending the Naval Postgraduate School
Lieutenant commanders were selected because their tenure, in
general, makes them eligible for all three voluntary
separation plans being studied Lieutenants and below had
too few years of service to be close to eligibility for the
15-year retirement plan, while officers with more than 16
years of tenure (generally commanders) are not presently
eligible for the VSI and SSB
After survey construction, a pilot study was conducted
to evaluate survey mechanics, check for biases, and ensure
completeness of content. Each member of the pilot group
completed a survey and was interviewed. The pilot study
indicated that the survey content was complete and unbiased,
requiring only minor changes in wording describing the three
separation plans. The survey can be found in Appendix A.
Survey questionnaires were distributed in student
mailboxes to a total of 137 lieutenant commanders assigned
to Naval Postgraduate School A total of 83 questionnaires
were returned, giving a response rate of 61 percent of the
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population. Eighty-three surveys were entered into the data
base constructed for the analysis. No surveys were rejected
due to insufficient information. Survey data was entered
using MINITAB statistical software and random cases were
screened for accuracy. No errors were found.
Generalizing the analysis to all lieutenant commanders
in the Navy is not a goal of the research as it was not
possible to acquire necessary data to statistically compare
the distribution of the NPS lieutenant commanders to the
distribution of lieutenant commanders in the Navy. Other
organizations have better data base access and resources
necessary to accomplish this. Therefore, it is assumed that
the distribution of NPS lieutenant commanders does not
necessarily approximate that of the entire Navy in several
respects. Although all warfare specialties are represented,
the proportion may not mirror that of the general
population. Additionally, the NPS sample group has a higher
level of educational attainment than the general population.
This research should be viewed from the perspective of
presenting relevant and new insight into the timely issue of
separation incentives through perceptions of the officers
most affected by the issues examined
The breakdown of the sample group by years of active
duty service (item 1 ) is presented in Table 1
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TABLE 1
BREAKDOUN BY YEARS OF ACTIVE DUTY SERVICE
Years Frequency Percent
10 5 6
11 21 25 3
12 19 22 9






The mean number of years of active duty service was
12 4, with over 97 percent of respondents having between 10
and 15 years of service This confirms that the survey
sample is primarily composed of those officers for which the
survey and its analysis were intended.
The majority of the sample group, 89.2 percent, was
married, with 2.4 percent divorced and 8.4 percent single.
The number of children ranged from zero to four, with a mean
of 11 child Eighty-seven percent of the group was male
The age of respondents ranged from 32 to 42 years, with a
mean age of 35 .7 years.
The breakdown of the sample group by designator (Item 6)





1100/1107 (General URL) 9 10 9
1110/1117 (Surface Warfare) 6 7 3
1120 (Submarine Warfare) 8 9 6
1140 (Special Operations) 1 12
1300 (Aviation, General) 1 1 2
1310/1317 (Aviation Warfare, pilot) 8 9 6
1320/1327 (Aviation Warfare, NFO) 8 9 6
1440/1460 (Eng. Duty Officer, EDO) 16 19 3
1510 (Aerospace EDO) 4 4 8







2900 (Nurse corps) 1 1 2
3100 (Supply corps) 10 12 1
5100 (Civil eng corps) 2 2 4
Total 83 100.0
The surface warfare community (1110/1117) is not well
represented in this sample group. As the largest warfare
community, it has the smallest percentage of respondents
(7 3 percent) when compared to submarine warfare (9 6
percent) and aviation warfare (20 4 percent). Aviation and
engineering duty officers are also heavily represented in
19
comparison to the relative small size of their communities
Therefore designator mix within the sample group differs
significantly from that which would be expected in the
general lieutenant commander population of the Navy
B. VARIABLES AND MEASURES
Each variable that was examined and its measurement are
explained below. Variable labels as used in statistical
analyses and presented in Tables and Appendices are given in
parentheses
.
1 . Tenure (YRSACDU)
Each respondent was asked to indicate the number of
years of active duty military service completed on the
questionnaire. An individual's value on this variable could
range from 8 to 20.
2. Spousal Support (SPOUSATT)
To measure spousal support, one question assessing
their spouse's feelings towards their Navy career was used
CRef . 6:p. 133. A response scale ranging from 1 (completely
opposed) to 7 (completely supportive) was used Not
applicable (N/A) was scored as 8.
3 Monetary Separation Incentives (LIKESSB, LIKEVSI
,
LIKEERP)
Respondents were asked to assess the likelihood of
accepting one of the three separation plans <;88B, VSJ and
15-year retirement) on a 7-point scale from 1= "highly
20
unlikely" to 7= "highly likely". An explanation of each
plan, method of calculating payment amounts, and comparison
of present values of SSB and VSI for lieutenant commanders
with varying years of tenure were included in the
questionnaire. Additionally, a question asking respondents
to rank their likelihood of accepting the three separation
plans, from 3 (most likely to accept) to 1 (least likely to
accept) was used as a means to break ties between likelihood
of various plans in order to get a clear cut ranking.
4. Non-monetary Separation Benefits (MEDICAL, COMM_EXC,
JOBLEAVE, FAMHOUSE, SEPCOUNS, EMPLASST)
The importance of non-monetary benefits in the
likelihood of accepting a separation incentive plan was
measured by asking respondents to evaluate six non-monetary
benefits on a 7-point scale from 1= "not important" to 7=
"extremely important" The benefits included: medical
benefits and care, commissary/exchange privileges,
permissive leave for job search, transitional use of
military family housing, pre-separat ion counseling, and
employment assistance These represent a combination of
current benefits offered by the voluntary separation and
early retirement plans being studied
5. Possibility of Reduction in Force (RIFPROB)
Respondents were asked to assess the possibility of
being involuntarily separated due to an involuntary
21
reduction in force on a 7-point scale from 1= "highly
unlikely" to 7= "highly likely".
6. Perceived Ease of Obtaining Comparable Civilian Job
(CIVJOB)
A single question asking how easy it would be to
find a job outside the Navy with approximately the same
income and fringe benefits, using a 7-point response scale
from 1= "very difficult" to 7= "very easy", measured
perceived ease of obtaining a comparable civilian job. CRef.
11 ;p. G-45]
7. Career Intent (CAR I NT)
A single question was used to assess career intent:
"What is your intention in pursuing an active Navy career at
least until you are eligible for a 20-year retirement?" A
7-point response scale was used to indicate an officer's
certainty of continuing an active Navy career, ranging from
1= "certain that I will not leave voluntarily prior to
becoming eligible for retirement" to 7= "certain I will not
voluntarily continue in the Navy until I'm eligible for
retirement." CRef. 11 :p. K-l
]
8. Dependent Variable: Likelihood of Accepting
Separation Incentive (LIKEERP)
The dependent variable, the likelihood of accepting
any incentive, was measured by using the largest value
obtained from each respondent on survey I tern 12 This
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question asked respondents to assess the likelihood of
accepting each of three monetary incentives (SSB, VSI and
15-year retirement) on a scale ranging from 1 (highly
unlikely) to 7 (highly likely). For example, if the
response for likelihood of accepting Special Separation
Benefit (SSB) was 1 (highly unlikely), the response for the
likelihood of accepting Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI)
was 4 (neutral), and the response for the likelihood of
accepting 15-year retirement was 6 (likely), the value of 6
was used for that respondent's likelihood of accepting an
incentive In case of a tied response between two plans,
the question asking respondents to rank their likelihood of
accepting the three plans was used to ascertain which plan
yielded the greatest likelihood of acceptance. In addition,
an open ended question asking why the respondent chose the
plan ranked most likely to accept was used to elicit factors




MINITAB statistical software was used for data analysis
A summary of variables is presented in Table 3
To arrive at values for the dependent variable,
responses to survey I tern 12 (likelihood of accepting each of
the three voluntary separation plans, Special Separation






















Years active duty service
Number of children
Age (in years)
Measures probability of RIF
Measures attitude of spouse
Measures career intent
Measures ease of finding
comparable civilian job
Measures likelihood of accepting
Special Separation Benefit
Measures likelihood of accepting
Voluntary Separation Incentive
Measures likelihood of accepting
15-year retirement plan
Measures importance of medical
care
Measures importance of commissary
and exchange privileges
Measures importance of permissive
leave for job search
Measures importance of temporary
use of military family housing
Measures importance of separation
counsel ing
Measures importance of employment
assi stance
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retirement) were checked to get the general trend of the
data Although the values varied considerably, every
respondent but one had given the 15-year retirement plan
either the highest value (indicating greatest likelihood of
acceptance) or had tied with another plan. There were ten
cases of tied values; nine cases rated likelihood of
acceptance of all three plans as highly unlikely (1 ) and one
case rated likelihood of acceptance of all three plans as
unlikely (2). In those cases, since ranking was not
meaningful because likelihood of acceptance was the same for
each alternative, the value used for the dependent variable
was either highly unlikely (1) or unlikely (2) as
appropriate As only one respondent had not given the 15-
year retirement plan the highest likelihood (that respondent
had rated the 15-year retirement plan as second most likely
to accept), the responses to I tern 12. c. (likelihood of
accepting 15-year retirement) were used as the dependent
variable, measuring the greatest likelihood of accepting a
separation incentive.
A second method of computing the dependent variable was
also used. A new variable, average likelihood of accepting
a separation incentive (AVG_LIKE), was created by summing
each respondent's responses to I tern 12 and dividing by
three This method of computing the dependent variable
would result in a weighted value including the entire
spectrum of a respondent's likelihood o.f accepting all three
25
voluntary separation plans Use of this dependent variable
could reveal relationships not accounted for by the
dependent variable using the greatest likelihood of
acceptance (LIKEERP)
Univariate statistics were computed for all variables
In addition to calculation of means, medians and standard
deviations, histograms were plotted in order to form initial
impressions of the data and decide how to proceed with the
analysis. Descriptive statistics, histograms and frequency
distributions can be found in Appendix B Univariate
analysis indicated that most distributions were highly
skewed, with response data uniformly distributed in only a
few cases
Correlation matrices were computed to examine relevant
relationships between the variables using Pearson product-
moment correlation. Since univariate statistics and
histograms of the data indicated nonnormal distributions,
nonparametr i c correlation using the Spearman rank
correlation coefficient was also accomplished Scatterplots
were formulated for all relevant pairings of variables
including those shown to have a significant positive or
negative correlation.
Using the MINITAB "BREG" command, the best two subsets
of regression were calculated using first one predictor of
the dependent variable [likelihood of accepting 15-year
retirement (LIKEERP)], then, two variables, until all
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variables were included The variables likelihood of
accepting VSI (LIKEVSI) and likelihood of accepting SSB
(LIKESSB) were not included as independent variables in the
regression analysis due to their high correlation with the
dependent variable and lack of meaningfulness as predictors
of the likelihood of accepting 15-year retirement
Multivariate regression analysis was then conducted
using the seven variables that were indicated by the best
subsets of regression output to yield the highest adjusted
R-squared Cimportance of medical benefits, family housing,
and permissive job leave (MEDICAL, FAMHOUSE , JOBLEAVE), age
(AGE), probability of reduction in force (RIFPROB), tenure
(YRSACDU) and number of children (CHILD)] Correlation
matrices, best subsets of regression output and the
multivariate regression analysis described above can be
found in Appendix B. The results of correlation analyses
and multivariate regression will be presented in Chapter IV.
Hypothesis testing was performed to determine if the
independent variables tenure (YRSACDU), spouse's attitude
(SPOUSATT), importance of non-monetary separation benefits
(MEDICAL, COMM_EXC, JOBLEAVE, FAMHOUSE, SEPCOUNS , and
EMPLASST), probability of reduction in force (RIFPROB),
perceived ease of obtaining a comparable civilian job
(CIVJOB), and career intent (CARINT) were either negatively
or positively linearly correlated with the dependent
variable, likelihood of accepting a separation incentive
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(LIKEERP). In each case, the null hypothesis stated that
the two variables are linearly uncorrelated The
alternative hypothesis was that the two variables are either
negatively or positively linearly correlated following the
specific hypotheses as presented in the previous chapter A
test statistic <t) was calculated using the zero order
correlation coefficient (r) A one-tailed test was used
with a significance level of 0.05, with a critical t-value
of 1 66 for a right-tailed test or -1 66 for a left-tailed
test (df=n-2)
A hypothesis test was also performed to determine the
relationship between three monetary separation incentives
and the likelihood of acceptance. Survey I tern 12 asked
respondents to rate the separation plans according to their
likelihood of acceptance from 1 (highly unlikely) to 7
(highly likely). Initial inspection of the data showed that
the both the mean and median ratings of the 15-year
retirement, plan were highest, with VSI second and SSB last
A wi thin-subjects analysis of variance was conducted to
determine if significant differences in the mean responses
across the three items existed The null hypothesis stated
that the means were equal. The alternative hypothesis
stated that the mean ratings were different The MINITAB
output specifies a p-value specifying the smallest
significance level at which the null hypothesis can be
rejected Therefore, if the p-value is less than or equal
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to the 05 significance level, the null hypothesis can be
rejected The results of hypothesis testing will be
presented in Chapter IV.
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IV. RESULTS OF DATA ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING
The following chapter provides results of univariate
statistics, correlation and multivariate regression analyses
of the determinants of likelihood of accepting a separation
incentive as well as results of hypothesis testing All
results described below are based on rating scales where 1=
a low rating of the variable and 7= a high rating of the
var iable
.
Respondents reported in general they were certain they
would not leave the Navy voluntarily prior to eligibility
for a 20-year retirement (Mean=1.4, SD= . 60 ) . They perceived
the probability of an involuntary reduction in force as
fairly unlikely (M=2.77, SD=1 65) and saw their spouses as
being very supportive of their Navy career (M=6.27,
SD=1 36). Respondents had mixed feelings on the ease of
finding a job outside the Navy with approximately the same
income and fringe benefits as they now have (M=4 01
,
SD=1 .64, Median=4 . 00) ; half felt it would be easy while the
other half perceived difficulty.
There was little likelihood of respondents accepting the
Special Separation Benefit (M=l 66, SD=1.16) Most
respondents said it would be fairly unlikely that they would
accept Voluntary Separation Incentive (M=2 30, SD=1 54),
while it was fairly likely they would accept a 15-year
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retirement plan (M=4 92, SD=2.01). When asked to rank their
likelihood of accepting the three plans, 15-year retirement
was ranked as most likely (M=2.85, SD= 50 ) , followed by VSI
(11=1.94, SD= 39) and SSB (11=1.19, SD= . 48 )
.
Non-monetary benefits were found to vary in importance
in the respondents' decisions to accept a separation
incentive and leave the Navy. Among the benefits studied,
medical was rated as extremely important in the decision
(11=6.12, SD=1.43), followed by commissary and exchange
privileges (11=4.74, SD=1 .75) and permissive leave for job
search (11=4.47, SD=1.69). The remaining benefits were given
much less importance in the decision process: employment
assistance (M=3.74, S0=1 .97), transitional use of family
housing (11=3.12, SD=1 92) and pre-separation counseling
(M=2.98, SD=1 83)
.
Responses to I tern 14 (explanatory comments for
separation plan rankings based on likelihood of acceptance)
were coded and sorted into 9 general categories. Table 4
provides a summary of these categories and the frequency of
responses in each category Some respondents gave comments
which fell into more than one category; some respondents
provided no comments. A total of 75 respondents provided
comments. Clearly, full retirement benefits and a monthly
income for life are most important to respondents in their
ranking of likelihood of accepting separation plans Other
financial factors, total monetary value of plan, income tax
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considerations, and cost of living adjustments to counteract
inflation, accounted for the majority of other comments
made. The small number of other comments made were
indirectly related to financial factors: earlier start on a
second career, payback on their investment in a Navy career,
compensation for sacrifices made while serving in the Navy,
and immediate cash to prepare for a new career
TABLE 4
FREQUENCY OF SUBJECTIVE COMMENTS
Comment Category Frequency
Full retirement benefits 43
Monthly income for life 35
Total monetary value 21
Tax considerations 16
COLA adjustment for inflation 15
Earlier start on second career 4
Payback on time invested in Navy 3
Compensation for sacrifices made 2
Cash to prepare for new career 1
A. RESULTS OF CORRELATION ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING
The zero order correlates (both Pearson correlation
coefficients and Spearman rank correlation coefficients) of
likelihood of accepting a 15-year retirement among
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lieutenant commanders at Naval Postgraduate School are
presented in Table 5
TABLE 5
RESULTS OF ZERO ORDER CORRELATIONS UITH
LIKELIHOOD OF ACCEPTING 1 5-YR RETIREMENT
Var lable Pearson Spearman
Tenure (years active duty) -.19 * -.16
Number of children
Age
Probability of reduction in force +.18 *
Attitude of spouse
Career intent
Ease of finding civilian job
Likelihood of accepting SSB +.28 ** +.23 **
Likelihood of accepting VSI +43 ** +.37 **
Importance of medical care -.24 ** - 21 *
Importance of commissary/exchange -.16 - 18 *
Importance of permissive job leave +02 +.08
Importance of family housing use -.15 - 14
Importance of sep counseling - 17 - 22 *#
Importance of employment asst +.14 - 17
Average likelihood of acceptance +.83 ** +83 **
* p < 10 level of significance
#* p < 05 level of significance
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+ 18 * + 20 *
- 14 - 1 1
+ 14
- 10 - 07
+ 07 + 03
+ 01 + 04
The zero order correlates of all variables can be found
in Appendix B (both Pearson correlation coefficients and
Spearman rank correlation coefficients)
Since the correlation between the average likelihood of
accepting a separation incentive (Av"G_LIKE) and the greatest
likelihood of accepting an incentive, which was the
likelihood of accepting the 15-year retirement (LIKEERP),
was very high (r=83), it was determined that the likelihood
of accepting 15-year retirement would be used as the sole
dependent variable. Due to the high correlation between the
two variables, the use of the variable average likelihood of
acceptance (Av"G_LIKE) would probably not account for
additional variance from that determined by the other
dependent variable.
Since the values of the two correlation coefficients for
each independent variable indicate fairly significant
differences, a decision of which correlation coefficient to
use (Pearson or Spearman) for hypothesis testing had to be
reached. Two methods for determining whether a sample
distribution is approximately normally distributed were
used The first method states that when 9 < median/mean <
11, and 3 times standard deviation < mean, a sample
distribution is assumed to be approximately normally
distributed The second method devised by David et al
.
(1954) states that if the ratio of range/standard deviation
falls outside a region of critical bounds for the ratio,
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then the hypothesis of normality is rejected at a given
significance level (a decision on whether to apply certain
parametric procedures should be reached at the 10
significance level) For n=83, these critical values at the
.10 significance level were 4.33 (lower bound) to 5.56
(upper bound). CRef 12:p 323-3283 When both methods were
applied to the variables, only age, attitude of the spouse
toward a Navy career (SPOUSATT), and importance of medical
benefits (MEDICAL) indicated a normal distribution of the
sample distribution. It would be appropriate to use the
Pearson correlation coefficient for only those variables.
Therefore, for hypothesis testing, the Spearman correlation
coefficient values will be used for all variables except
spouse's attitude (SPOUSATT) and importance of medical
benefits (MEDICAL).
1. Hypothesis 1: Tenure (Years Active Duty Service)
The null hypothesis stated that tenure is not
linearly related to the likelihood of accepting an
incentive. The alternative hypothesis was tenure is
negatively related to the likelihood of accepting an
incentive The Spearman correlation (r=-16) is in the
hypothesized direction, however the value of the test
statistic was t=-l .46 Since this is greater than the
critical value of -1 66, the null hypothesis was accepted
Therefore, the variables tenure and likelihood of accepting
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a 15-year retirement plan are not linearly correlated at the
.05 level of significance. This lack of correlation could
be due to the strong career intention of the respondents,
and their stated desire to remain in the Navy until 20-year
retirement eligibility, regardless of their tenure
2. Hypothesis 2: Spousal Support
The alternative hypothesis was that spousal support
is negatively related to the likelihood of accepting an
incentive The Pearson correlation was r=- 10 and the value
of the test statistic was t=- . 085 Since this is greater
than the critical value, the null hypothesis was accepted
Therefore, the variables spousal support and likelihood of
accepting 15-year retirement are not linearly correlated at
the 0.05 level of significance
Failure of this variable to be significantly
correlated to the likelihood of accepting early retirement
may be due to the strong career intention held by the sample
group. They may intend to remain in the Navy until full
retirement eligibility despite a spouse non-supportive of
their Navy career The Navy career may be viewed as a
necessary means to an end—an end which will be reached in
the near future.
A more likely explanation is the limited number of
respondents with low spousal support ratings. No effect can
be found with this skewed a distribution.
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3. Hypothesis 3: Monetary Separation Incentives
The alternative hypothesis stated that monetary
separation incentives are positively related to the
likelihood of accepting a separation incentive, i.e. the
greater the monetary incentive, the more likely to accept.
As stated previously, the monetary value of the separation
incentives can be ranked (highest value to lowest) 15-year
retirement, VSI, and SSB. When respondents were asked to
rate their likelihood of accepting each separation incentive
plan from 1 (highly unlikely) to 7 (highly likely), 15-year
retirement was rated highest (M=4 92, SD=2 01 ) , VSI was
rated second (M=2.30, SD=1.54), and SSB was rated least
likely to accept (11=1.66, SD=1.16). A wi thin-subj ec ts
analysis of variance (Appendix B) indicated significant
differences in the mean responses across those items
(F=95 61
,
p < .000). This clearly establishes an overall
ranking of likelihood of accepting a separation incentive:
15-year retirement > VSI > SSB (from most likely to least
likely) This directly corresponds to the monetary value
rankings of the incentive plans: 15-year retirement > VSI >
SSB (from high to low) In other words, as the monetary
value of the plans increases, their likelihood of acceptance
increases The null hypothesis that monetary separation
incentives are not linearly related to the likelihood of
accepting a separation incentive was rejected.
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4. Hypothesis 4: Non—monetary Separation Benefits
The alternative hypothesis stated the greater the
importance of non-monetary separation benefits, the less
likely to accept a separation incentive The r-values and
the respective test statistics for the importance of the
benefits were:
Medical: r= -.24; t=-2 23 , which is less than the
critical value of -1 .66 The null hypothesis that there
is no linear correlation was rejected. Therefore, at
the .05 level of significance, the importance of medical
benefits is negatively correlated to the likelihood of
accepting a separation incentive (the greater the
importance of medical care, the less likely to accept).
Commissary/exchange privileges: r=- 18; t=-l .65, which
is greater than the critical value of -1 66 Therefore
the null hypothesis was accepted; at the .05
significance level, the importance of
commissary/exchange privileges is not linearly
correlated to the likelihood of accepting a separation
incentive. (It should be noted that there would be a
significant negative correlation at the .06 significance
level .
)
Permissive job leave: r=0.08; t=0 72, which is less
than the critical value of 1 .66. The null hypothesis
was accepted; at the .05 significance level there is no
linear correlation between the importance of permissive
job leave and the likelihood of accepting a separation
incentive
.
Use of military family housing: r=-.14; t=-l .27, which
is greater than the critical value of -1 .66. Therefore,
the null hypothesis was accepted. There is no linear
correlation between the use of military family housing
and the likelihood of accepting a separation incentive
at the 05 significance level
Separation counseling: r=-.22; t=-2 23, which is less
than the critical value of -1 .66 The null hypothesis
was rejected At the 05 level of significance, there
is a negative correlation between the importance of
separation counseling and the likelihood of accepting a
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separation incentive (the greater the importance of
counseling, the less likely to accept)
Employment assistance: r-— .17; t=-l 55, which is
greater than the critical value of -1 66 The null
hypothesis was accepted; at the 05 level of
significance the importance of employment assistance and
the likelihood of accepting a separation incentive are
not linearly correlated.
The negative correlation of the importance of
medical benefits with likelihood of accepting a voluntary
separation plan was not surprising. Neither SSB nor VSI
offers any kind of medical benefits. Although the 15-year
retirement plan offers full retirement benefits including
medical care, those respondents who ranked the importance of
medical benefits very high may have lumped all three plans
together while formulating their response, reducing their
likelihood of accepting the 15-year retirement plan in
tandem with the other two options.
The negative correlation of separation counseling
could be due to the lack of knowledge about the availability
and effectiveness of the current separation counseling
(transition assistance) program. If respondents felt there
was a viable program in existence which met all their needs,
then it seems likely that the importance attached to that
benefit would not have necessarily decreased their
likelihood of acceptance, as was the case Perhaps
respondents feel the need for more counseling and assistance
than is currently provided.
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The lack of linear correlation between the
likelihood of acceptance of a separation plan and importance
of other benefits emphasizes the importance of medical
benefits, commissary/exchange privileges and separation
counseling. Considering the high cost of civilian medical
care and shopping in civilian markets, the importance of
those continued benefits upon separation is certainly
understandable. Similarly, based on the current deluge of
individuals utilizing the Transition Assistance Program, its
value to separating servi cemembers is underscored.
5. Hypothesis 5: Possibility of Involuntary RIF
The alternative hypothesis stated that the greater
the possibility of an involuntary reduction in force, the
more likely to accept a separation incentive. The
correlation coefficient was calculated to be r= 14. Since
the value of the test statistic, t=l .27, was less than the
critical value of 1 .66, the null hypothesis was accepted.
Therefore, at the 0.05 level of significance, the
possibility of an involuntary RIF and likelihood of 15-year
retirement acceptance are not linearly correlated. As
there was limited variance in this variable, the possibility
of determining a significant correlation with likelihood of
early retirement was constrained. The fact that most
respondents perceive little likelihood of an involuntary RIF
could be heavily influenced by the commitment made by Navy
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officials thus far to protect its people from involuntary
RIFs.
6. Hypothesis 6: Perceived Ease of Obtaining
Comparable Civilian Employment
It was hypothesized that the greater the perceived
ease of obtaining comparable civilian employment, the more
likelihood of accepting an incentive. The correlation
coefficient was calculated to be 0.04, and the value of the
test statistic was t=0 36 , which is less than the critical
value of 1 . 66 . Therefore, the null hypothesis was accepted
At the 0.05 level of significance, perceived ease of
obtaining comparable civilian employment and likelihood of
accepting 15-year retirement are not linearly correlated
One explanation for this lack of correlation could
be that those likely to accept a 15-year retirement plan
would have steady income with full benefits which would
protect them during possible periods of unemployment
encountered while seeking a new job, thus increasing their
perceived ease associated with finding comparable
employment
The fact that responses on this variable were
approximately normally distributed, (with a mean and median
of 4 0) could indicate that the sample group doesn't have a
clear idea of job market conditions or feel differentially
prepared for work in the civilian job market. Since
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officers have varied warfare specialties, their perception
of marketability of their skills may vary greatly Although
lieutenant commanders have obviously been out of the job
market for some time, given the increased marketability
created by their master's degree earned at Naval
Postgraduate School, it is expected responses on this survey
item would have been skewed toward greater ease in finding a
comparable job However, current economic conditions and
high unemployment, coupled with the large numbers of
civilian organizations which are downsizing, may have
decreased optimism about finding a comparable job.
Alternatively, those individuals with the highest
expectations regarding civilian work opportunities may be
more strongly influenced by their dedication to their
current career in the Navy; thus, no relationship would be
found between perceived employabi 1 i ty and likelihood of
accepting early retirement
7. Hypothesis 7: Career Intent
The alternative hypothesis stated that there was a
negative relationship between career intent and likelihood
of accepting a separation incentive The value of the test
statistic was t=0
. 27 , which is less than the critical value
of 1 66. The null hypothesis was accepted Therefore,
career intent and likelihood of accepting 15-year retirement
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are not linearly correlated at the OS level of
signi f i cance
The failure of this variable to be significantly
correlated to the likelihood of accepting early retirement
may be a function of the fact that the sample group was
composed of lieutenant commanders who, without exception,
intend to remain in the Navy until eligibility for 20-year
retirement Responses on the survey items measuring career
intent (CARINT) had a range of one to three (on a seven
point scale), with a mean of 1 4, standard deviation of 6
and median of 1.0. Very simply stated, respondents in this
sample group have no intention of voluntarily leaving the
Navy. The limited variance in career intent constrained the
correlational findings.
B RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS
The multivariate regression consisted of seven
predictors for the dependent variable, likelihood of
accepting 15-year retirement (LIKEERP), that were derived
from the MINITAB best subsets of regression output.
Analysis of this output, which calculates the best two
subsets for regression beginning with one variable, then
adding one variable until all independent variables are
included in the regression, indicates that the best
combination which can be obtained uses seven independent
variables and results in an R-squared of 216 (the maximum
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adjusted R-squared should be used when deciding how many
variables to use) When multivariate regression using those
seven variables was conducted, number of children (CHILD),
importance of medical benefits (MEDICAL), tenure (YRSACDU),
and importance of family housing (FAMHOUSE) were found to be
significant at the .10 level. Results of this multivariate
regression are shown in Table 6; computer output can be
found in Appendix B.
TABLE 6
RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS
N=83; R-sq= 216; F=2 95 (p= 009)
Variable t-ratio
CONSTANT 3.52 **
Importance of medical benefits -2 13 **
Tenure (years active duty) -1 .64 *
Number of children 2 50 **
Probability of reduction in force 1 .27
Age -1 07
Importance of mil. family housing -1 92 *
Importance of permissive job leave 1 09
* p < .10 level of significance
** p< 05 level of significance
Interpretation of results of regression analysis should
be made in light of choice of the dependent variable,
likelihood of accepting a 15-year retirement plan. It could
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be misleading to generalize these results to the likelihood
of accepting any of the three voluntary separation incentive
plans, although the correlation between the average
likelihood of accepting an incentive and the likelihood of
accepting the 15-year retirement plan was very high (r=83)
Of the three separation plans being studied, only the 15-
year retirement plan showed adequate variance to perform
meaningful regression analysis. Since respondents in
general stated they would not accept either VSI or SSB , then
use of regression analysis to identify predictors of the
overall likelihood of acceptance should be done with
caution
.
It is clear that many other factors are involved in this
decision process from the amount of variance not accounted
for in the regression analysis <R-squared= 216) The use
the number of children as a predictor for the likelihood of
accepting 15-year retirement (t=2.50, p= 014) is
understandable in light of the stress a Navy career puts
upon a family The more children a servi cemember has, the
more difficult the frequent moves become The child's
education is disrupted, the socialization process has to be
repeated in a new location, and the physical move itself
becomes more difficult with more children. There may be a
higher incidence of working spouses in larger families who
would also be disrupted by a Navy career. While one might
consider greater likelihood to remain in the Navy for
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financial reasons with larger families, a strong case for
leaving the military as a family becomes larger can
certainly be made and is supported by the data
The significance in the regression (t=-l 64, p= . 1 04 ) of
the variable tenure (YRSACDU) is easily explained; as an
officer becomes more senior and nears eligibility for 20-
year retirement, there is less likelihood of accepting any
option short of full retirement. This was also reflected in
the strong career intention of the sample group and the
subjective comments made by respondents.
The variable importance of transitional use of military
family housing (t=-l
.92, p= . 059 ) was significant in the
regression despite its lack of significance in the zero
order correlation (r=-14) and its low mean rated importance
to respondents in their acceptance decision of 3.12
(somewhat important). Its significance in correlation may
have been constrained by its skewed distribution This may
be influenced by the number of children respondents have;
the use of family housing would be more important as family
size increases Since the mean number of children was 1 .5
<median=l), those respondents having large families (more
than 2 children) comprised only a small percentage (18
percent) of the sample group It therefore seems logical
that transitional use of family housing would be more
important to that portion of the sample group, which would
explain the lack of significant zero order correlation and
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lack of stated importance of the benefit to the majority of
respondents
.
For reasons similar to those previously discussed in the
hypothesis testing of the benefits variables, the importance
of medical benefits is again reflected in that variable's
significance in the regression (t=-2.13, p= . 036 ) . In
response to I tern 15, which asked respondents to indicate the
importance of each benefit to their decision whether to
accept a voluntary separation plan, the mean rating of
medical benefits/care was 6. 12 (extremely important), with a
median rating of 7. Importance of other benefits was
overshadowed by the importance of medical care; the mean
rating of commissary/exchange privileges was 4.74
(median=5), placing that benefit second in importance,
although rated only somewhat important. It can be inferred
from the significance of the importance of medical care
(MEDICAL) in both the regression and zero order correlation
(r=-24), as well as its rated importance in respondents'
decisions whether to accept a voluntary separation plan,
that medical care is clearly the benefit with greatest
importance to respondents in this sample group.
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V DISCUSSION
It is clear that the sample group of lieutenant
commanders surveyed at the Naval Postgraduate School is
career oriented and has little intention of leaving the Navy
voluntarily prior to eligibility for a 20-year retirement
Special Separation Benefit would be little enticement for
this group, with fewer than four percent of respondents
rating it as likely to accept. Fewer than 11 percent of
respondents said they would be likely to accept Voluntary
Separation Incentive. Only the 15-year retirement plan was
viewed as a viable alternative among the three plans, with
nearly 60 percent of respondents rating it as likely to
accept Comments provided by respondents explaining reasons
for their ranking of likelihood of accepting the alternative
plans could all be categorized into the desire for financial
incentives or desire for full retirement benefits.
These results are consistent with the Lozier and Dooris
study (1991) which found that overall financial status and
eligibility for full retirement benefits are key
determinants of the retirement decision Only the 15-year
retirement plan offers full retirement benefits; it was the
only plan most respondents would accept
The lack of Special Separation Benefit's (SSB)
enticement for this sample group, contrary to current
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acceptance trends among enlisted Navy servi cemembers , can be
attributed to the difference in tenure between the two
groups and a greater depth of financial planning knowledge
among the sample group. Currently, SSB has not been offered
to enlisted personnel with seniority levels equivalent to
those of the sample group. If SSB had been offered to more
senior personnel, it seems highly likely that the
attractiveness of SSB as an enticement would be greatly
diminished. Additionally, the level of educational
attainment of the sample group is clearly greater than that
of both the enlisted ranks and the general officer ranks.
This group of lieutenant commanders, through their core
education in financial management at NPS regardless of
curriculum, possesses a generally greater level of
sophistication about personal financial planning than those
without graduate education, officer or enlisted. As stated
in the subjective comments made by respondents, the majority
is keenly aware of the tax consequences of receiving a lump
sum payment, inflation effects and the importance of
receiving cost of living allowances -and medical care
Stated career intention of the respondents, whose length
of service ranged from 10 to 19 years, coupled with
subjective comments from respondents pointing to the
importance of a traditional retirement plan with full
benefits, supported the Gotz and McCall study which found
retirement pay to be an overwhelming inducement for officers
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with over 10 years of service to remain in the Air Force
The majority of respondents in the sample group clearly will
not voluntarily leave the Navy without at least a 15-year
retirement plan with full benefits. The investment of time
served on active duty and sacrifices made (such as family
separation while deployed) seem to provide large incentives
in themselves to remain until eligible for retirement
Survey results seem to point to the likelihood of
accepting a 15-year retirement plan being more closely
linked to decisions related to early retirement/retirement
factors rather than turnover/retention factors Possible
determinants of the likelihood of accepting a voluntary
separation incentive that were taken from the turnover
literature (career intent, spousal support, perceived
availability of civilian jobs and tenure) were not
significantly correlated The variables chosen for this
study taken from factors found to affect early retirement
and retirement decisions (importance of medical benefits and
monetary incentives) were found to be significantly
correlated at the .10 level'
One weakness in the research pertains to selection of
the dependent variable as likelihood of accepting a 15-year
retirement plan (the variable respondents ranked as having
the greatest likelihood of acceptance) Responses from the
sample group of lieutenant commanders indicated that, if
given a choice, they would not accept either VSI or SSB If
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respondents would not accept either plan, use of regression
analysis to identify predictors of their acceptance should
be used with caution. In essence, with a sample group of
this seniority level, a 15-year early retirement plan with
full benefits is the only acceptable alternative to a 20-
year retirement. Therefore, interpretation of regression
analysis and relationships between variables is most
meaningful if made in the framework of the dependent
variable likelihood of accepting a 15-year retirement plan
However, since the average likelihood of accepting an
incentive plan correlated very highly with the likelihood of
accepting the 15-year retirement, then these results could
conceivably be generalized to the average likelihood of
accepting a voluntary separation plan. The average
likelihood (Av"G_LIKE) dependent variable could be useful as
an alternative in future research. Its greater generality
and fair amount of variance may result in a more valid
measure of likelihood to accept an early retirement plan
The seven predictor regression analysis results
accounted for only 21 6 percent of the total variance in the
measures This strongly suggests that there are other
dimensions relevant to the likelihood of accepting a
voluntary separation plan. Further research in this area
should be closely linked to financial factors (monetary
value of the early retirement plan along with full
benefits) .Focus groups should be held to determine what
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changes, if any, could be made to early retirement plans and
other voluntary separation plans in order to entice this
career oriented group to leave the Navy (such as additional
support in job placement, greater educational assistance,
etc). Further research could also discover if there is a
similar pattern of responses among enlisted servi cemembers
with 10 - 19 years of active duty service.
One criticism of implementation of the 15-year
retirement plan has been that too many lieutenant commanders
would choose to voluntarily leave the Navy, resulting in a
large gap in that rank. However, this research does not
support that idea of a mass exodus. The stated career
intent (CARINT) of respondents was extremely strong, with
100 percent of respondents rating their probability of
remaining in the Navy until eligible for 20-year retirement
as certain, almost certain, or probable. Only 60 percent of
respondents rated their likelihood of accepting the early
retirement as higher than neutral. One weakness of surveys
in this area is that respondents are only hypothet l cal ly
faced with the choice, and are more likely to overstate
their desire to accept early retirement— in reality it's
less stressful to maintain the status quo and not subject
oneself to unemployment and job hunting.
The voluntary separation survey used in this research
could have value to other groups than lieutenant commanders
It could be useful for other groups with less seniority to
52
determine their likelihood of acceptance of VSI or SSB, or
for senior enlisted personnel with comparable tenure to
determine their likelihood of accepting a 15-year retirement
plan .
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VI . SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this study was to develop a survey to
analyze lieutenant commanders' perceptions of three
voluntary separation plans, Special Separation Benefit,
Voluntary Separation Incentive and 15-Year Retirement
Several factors were studied to identify their relationship
to the likelihood of accepting one of the plans To
accomplish this, a survey of lieutenant commanders attending
Naval Postgraduate School was conducted Although the
convenience sample used does not closely approximate the
distribution of lieutenant commanders in the Navy, it does
represent a cross section of a group most directly affected
by the issues that are the subject of the research.
Survey findings indicate:
* Respondents are certain they will not leave the Navy
voluntarily prior to eligibility for a 20-year
ret 1 rement
* Respondents perceive litt-le probability of being
involuntarily separated through a reduction in force
* There is little likelihood that respondents would accept
either the Special Separation Benefit (SSB) or Voluntary
Separation Incentive (VSI ) if given the choice
* The majority of respondents (60 percent) express some
likelihood of accepting a 15-year early retirement plan
if given the opportunity
* Respondents rate medical care as the most important
benefit in their decision to accept a voluntary
separation incentive.
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* Full retirement benefits and a monthly income for life
are the two most important factors respondents
considered in their ranking of the separation plans in
order of their likelihood of acceptance
The monetary value of a separation incentive is
positively related to the likelihood of acceptance
Based on analysis and interpretation of survey results,
the following conclusions were reached:
* The likelihood of acceptance of a separation incentive
by lieutenant commanders is strongly influenced by the
amount and type of the monetary incentive as well as
eligibility for full benefits.
It can be inferred from quantitative analyses and from
explanatory comments for ranking voluntary separation
plans that the likelihood of acceptance is more strongly
influenced by factors found to affect retirement/early
retirement decisions than those factors affecting
turnover decisions
• Regression analysis is not useful for predicting the
likelihood of accepting VSI or SSB because respondents
reported they would not accept either plan.
The regression analysis with seven predictors accounted
for only 21 .6 percent of the total variance in the
measures, suggesting there are other dimensions relevant
to classifying likelihood of accepting a voluntary
separation incentive
This research has identified key points decision makers
should consider when proposing alternatives to encourage
mid-grade officers to voluntarily separate In general,
they are a career oriented group who, unless pressured to
separate due to a reduction in force or failure to be
promoted, plan to remain in the Navy at least until eligible
for a 20-year retirement. If the drawdown requires
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reduction of this career officer force, nothing short of an
early retirement plan with full benefits would be perceived
as adequate compensation. Current plans (Voluntary
Separation Incentive and Special Separation Benefit) would
be ineffective in enticing this group of lieutenant
commanders to voluntarily separate and leave the Navy prior
to 20-year retirement eligibility.
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APPENDIX A
VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PLAN SURVEY
This appendix contains a copy of the survey administered
to lieutenant commanders attending the Naval Postgraduate
School. The survey was used to collect data for use in this
thesis
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VOLUNTARY SEPARATION PLAN SURVEY
The purpose of this questionnaire is to identify factors
influencing the decision to accept one of three voluntary
separation plans: Variable Separation Incentive (VSI), Special
Separation Benefit (SSB) and 15 Year Retirement As you know,
VSI and SSB are being currently being offered selectively to
certain enlisted servi cemembers and officers of other services
A 15 Year Retirement Plan was recently proposed by the Chairman
of the Senate Armed Services Committee You've been selected to
participate in this survey because, as a LCDR
,
you are in a
position to be eligible for all three of these plans.
With further budget cutbacks on the horizon, it may be only
a matter of time before Navy officers are faced with the decision
of whether to accept one of the separation plans and leave the
Navy So far, neither VSI nor SSB has been as successful as
originally hoped in enticing servicemembers to voluntarily leave
the military. With this survey, I hope to identify critical
factors decision makers should consider when developing these
plans
After graduation from NPS, we all have obligated service
that must be fulfilled before we can leave the Navy. However,
for the purpose of this survey, please respond to the questions
as though that were not a factor
Your time in completing this survey is greatly appreciated
Please return your completed survey to SMC 1347 Thanks for your
help!
AM
( a . P . FOR[
V^/lcdr USNR
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Questions 1 through 7 request background data which will be used to ascertain
the demographics of the sample group Your anonymity will be strictly maintained
1 How many years have you been an active duty officer 7 years
2 Marital status: Married Widowed Separated Divorced Single
3. Number of children: 1 2 3 4 5 or more
4. What is your rank' LTjg LT LCDR CDR
5 What is your sex? Male Female
6 What is your designator?
7. What is your age?
Questions 8-11 concern an assessment of your job security, spousal support,
career intentions, and ease of finding a civilian job
8. How likely do you think it is that you might be involuntarily separated
(through a reduction in force)?
Highly Highly
unlikely Neutral likely12 3 4 5 6 7
9 How do you think your spouse feels toward your Navy career?
Completely Completely
opposed Neutral supportive N/A12 3 4 5 6 7 8
10 What is your intention in pursuing an active Navy career at least until you are
eligible for a 20-year retirement 7
1 am certain that I will not leave the Navy voluntarily prior to becoming eligible
for retirement
I am almost certain I will continue my military career if possible
1 probably will remain in the Navy until I am eligible for retirement
I don't know if I will continue or not
I probably will not continue in the Navy until I am eligible for retirement
I am almost certain that I will leave the Navy as soon as possible
I am certain that I will not voluntarily continue in the Navy until I am eligible
for retirement.
11 How easy would it be for you to find a job outside the Navy with approximately the
same income and fringe benefits you now have 7
Very Very
difficult Neutral easy12 3 4 5 6 7
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Questions 12 thru 15 concern various voluntary separation plans either currently in use
or proposed For the purpose of this survey, the following terms are defined:
Special Separation Benefit (SSB) : Lump sum benefit equal to 1 5% of annual base pay
multiplied by years of service This option gives separating members the same transition
benefits as those involuntarily separated (4 months medical coverage, 24 months commissary
privileges, job counseling and placement assistance, permission to remain in government
family housing for up to 2 months after separation) The lump sum benefit is taxable as
regular income in year received A minimum of 6 years active duty service is needed to
qualify for this benefit.
Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI) : Immediate annuity equal to 2.5% of base pay
multiplied by years of service Payments continue for twice the number of years of
service. Annual payments are not adjusted for inflation. A minimum of 6 years active duty
service is needed to qualify for this benefit.
15-Year Early Retirement : Immediate annuity using same formula as traditional retired pay
(2.5% of base pay multiplied by years of service) Annual payments are adjusted each year
for inflation, payments continue for lifetime Members receive full traditional retirement
benefits (medical care, commissary/exchange privileges, etc). A minimum of 15 years active
duty service is needed to qualify for this benefit.
Representative payments under SSB and VSI can be found on the chart below Total present
value of VSI is discounted at 7% Initial monthly payment for 15-year retirement would be
the same as the VSI payment for year 15 (or appropriate number years of service):
Years of service
LCDR 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
SSB Lump sum 47, 866 56,813 62,495 72,006 78 006 87, 840 34, 114 104, 795
VSI Annual payment 7, 978 9,469 10,416 12,001 '3, 001 14, 640 15, 686 17, 466
Number of years 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
Present value 85, 866 107,336 123,276 147,278 164, 510 190, 125 208, 269 236, 343
Source: Navy Tjimes, February 17, 1992, p 16
Highly Highly
unlikely Neutral likely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. If you were given a choice of the following voluntary separation plans, how likely is
it that you would accept one of the incentives 7 Respond to each alternative using the
7-point scale below:
a. Special separation benefit
b Voluntary separation incentive
c. 15-year early retirement
13 Rank the following separation plans in order of likelihood that you would accept them:
(3 = most likely to accept, 1 = least likely to accept)
a Special separation benefit
b Voluntary separation incentive
c. 15-year early retirement
14 Please provide an explanation of your ranking in question 13, especially for the
separation plan you were most likely to accept Use the back of this sheet if necessary.
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15 Please indicate the importance of each of the following non-monetary benefits to
your decision whether to accept a voluntary separation plan and leave the Navy prior to
a 20-year retirement Respond using the following scale:
Medical benefits/care
Commissary/exchange privileges
Permissive leave for job search
























This appendix contains the computer results used in data
analysis of the sample group A table of descriptive
statistics for the variables (including mean values and
standard deviation), the frequency distributions of survey
item responses, the zero order correlation matrices, the
best subsets of regression output, and the results of
multivariate regression analysis and analysis of variance
are inc luded
.
A summary of descriptions of computer variables can be




N MEAN MEDIAN TRMEAN ST0EV SEME AN MIN MAX
yrsacdu 83 12 434 12 000 1 2 360 1 548 170 10 000 19 000
crii Id 83 1 458 1 000 1 400 1151 126 000 4 000
age 83 3S 663 36 000 35 573 2 216 243 32 000 42 000
p i fprob 83 2 771 2 000 2 680 1 648 181 1 000 7 000
spousatt 83 6 277 7 000 6 373 1 364 ISO 2 000 8 000
car int 83 1 3976 1 0000 1 3333 6036 0663 1 0000 3 0000
c iv job 83 4 012 4 000 4 013 1 642 180 1 000 7 000
1 ikessb 83 1 663 1 000 1 507 1 . 161 127 1 000 6 000
1 ikevsi 83 2 301 2 000 2 173 1 536 169 1 000 7 000
1 ikeerp 83 4 916 5 000 5 013 2 007 220 1 000 7 000
rankssb 83 1 1928 1 0000 1 1200 4803 0527 1 .0000 3 0000
rankvsi 83 1 9398 2 0000 1 9333 3935 0432 1 . 0000 3 0000
rankerp 83 2 8554 3 0000 2 9467 0.4971 0546 1 0000 3 0000
medical 83 6 120 7 000 6 320 1 .426 157 1 000 7 000
comm_exc 83 4 735 5 000 4 813 1 .747 192 1 ooo 7 000
jobleave 83 4 470 4 000 4 520 1 692 186 1 000 7 000
famhouie 83 3 120 3 000 3 027 1 922 21 1 1 000 7 000
sepcouns 83 2 976 3 000 2 893 1 834 201 1 000 7 000
•mplasst 83 3 735 4 000 3 707 1 970 216 1 000 7 000
SUMMARY OF VARIABLES
























Tenure (years active duty service)
Number of children
Age Cin years)
Probability of reduction in force
Attitude of spouse toward Navy career
Career intent
Perceived ease of finding civilian job
Likelihood of accepting SSB
Likelihood of accepting VSI
Likelihood of accepting 15-yr retirement
Rank of likelihood of accepting SSB
Rank of likelihood of accepting VSI
Rank of likelihood of accepting 15-yr ret
Medi cal /heal th care benefit
Commissary/exchange benefit
Permissive job hunting leave





























1 1 21 26 25 30 31 33 4 2 76 2 41 91 57
12 19 45 22 89 54 22 5 7 83 8 43 100 00
13 21 66 25 30 79 52 N= 83
14 10 76 12.05 91 57
15 5 81 6 02 97 59
16 1 82 1 20 98 80
19 1 83 1 20 100.00
N= 83
child COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT sex COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT
21 21 25 30 25 30 1 72 72 86 75 86 75
1 22 4-3 26 51 51 81 2 1 1 83 13 25 100 00
2 25 68 30 12 81 93 N= 83
3 1 1 79 13 25 95 18
4 4 83 4 82 1 00 00
N= 83
age COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT r i f prob COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT
32 3 3 3.61 3 61 1 21 21 25 30 25 30
33 14 17 16 87 20 48 2 27 48 32 53 57 83
34 1 1 28 13.25 33 73 3 9 57 10 84 68 67
35 13 41 15 66 49 40 4 10 67 12 05 80 72
36 14 55 16.87 66 27 5 9 76 10 84 91 57
37 1 1 66 13 25 79 52 6 6 82 7 23 98 80
38 8 74 9 64 89 16 - 7 1 83 1 20 1 00 00
39 5 79 6 02 95 18 N= 83
40 2 81 2.41 97 59
41 1 82 1 20 98 80
42 1 83 1 .20 100 00
N= 83
desig COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT desig COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT
1 100 8 8 9 64 9 64 2900 1 71 1 20 85 54
1 107 1 9 1 20 10 84 3100 10 81 12 OS 97 59
1 1 10 4 13 4.82 15 66 5100 2 83 2 41 100 00
1 1 17 2 15 2.41 18 07 N= 83
1 120 8 23 9 64 27.71
1 140 1 24 1 20 28 92
1300 1 25 1 20 ' 30 1
2
1310 7 32 8 43 38 55
1317 1 33 1 20 39 76
1320 5 38 6 02 45 78
1327 3 41 3 61 49 40




1510 4 61 4 82 73 49
1520 2 63 2 41 75 90
1610 2 65 2 41 78.31
1630 1 66 1 20 79 52
1800 4 70 4 82 84 34
spousal
t
COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT cannt COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT
2 1 1 1 20 1 20 1 55 55 66 27 66 27
3 4 5 4 82 6 02 2 23 78 27 71 93.98
4 7 12 8 43 1 4 46 3 5 83 6 02 100 00
S 4 16 4 82 19 28 N= 83
6 19 35 22 89 42 17
7 39 74 46 99 89 16
8 9 83 10 84 100 00
N = 83
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c i v j ob COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT 1 i kessb COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT
CUMPCT
1 9 9 10 84 10 84 1 55 55 66 27 66
27
2 5 Id 6 02 16 87 2 13 68 15 66 81
93
3 16 30 19 28 36 14 3 8 76 9 64
91 57
4 20 50 24 10 60.24 4 4 80 A 82 96 39
5 16 66 19 28 79 52 5 1 81 1 20 97 59
6 13 79 15 66 95 18 6 2 83 2 41 100 00
7 4 83 4 82 100 00 N = 83
N= 83
1 ikevsi COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT 1 i keerp COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT
1 36 36 43 37 43 37 1 9 9 10 84 10 84
2 20 56 24. 10 67 47 2 5 14 6 02 16 87
3 6 62 7 23 74 70 3 2 16 2 41 19 28
4 12 74 14. 46 89 16 4 17 33 20 48 39 76
5 6 80 7 23 96 39 5 1 1 44 13 25 53 01
6 2 82 2 41 98 80 6 13 57 15 66 68 67
7 1 83 1 20 100 00 7 26 83 31 33 100 00
N= 83 N= 83
rankssb COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT rank vs
l
COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT
1 70 70 84 34 84 34 1 9 9 10.84 10 84
2 10 80 12 05 96 39 2 70 79 84 34 95 18
3 3 83 3.61 1 00 . 00 3 4 83 4 82 100.00
N= 83 N= 83
rankerp COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT
1 5 5 6 02 6 02
2 2 7 2.41 8 43
3 76 83 91 .57 1 00 00
N= 83
medical COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT comm exc COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT
1 3 3 3 61 3 61 1 6 6 7 23 7 23
3 1 4 1 20 4 82 2 5 1 1 6 02 13 25
4 6 10 7 23 12 05 3 5 16 6 02 19 28
5 10 20 12 05 24 10 4 19 35 22 89 42 17
6 13 33 15 66 39 76 5 17 52 20 48 62 65





83 18 07 100 00
jobleave COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT f amhouse COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT
1 7 7 8 43 8 43 1 24 24 28 92 28 92
2 5 12 6 02 1 4 46 2 1 4 38 16 87 45 78
3 4 16 4 82 19 28 3 9 47 10 84 56 63
4 29 45 34 94 54.22 4 19 66 22 89 79 52
5 12 57 14 46 68 67 5 4 70 4 82 84 34
6 16 73 19 28 87 95 6 7 77 8 43 92 77
7 10 83 12 05 100 00 7 6 83 7 23 100 00
N= 83 N= 83
sepc ouns COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT empl asst COUNT CUMCNT PERCENT CUMPCT
1 30 30 36 14 36 14 1 21 21 25 30 25 30
2 8 38 9 64 45 78 2 4 25 4 82 30 12
3 7 45 8 43 54 22 3 5 30 6 02 36 1 4
A 21 66 25 30 79 52 4 21 51 25 30 61 45
5 8 74 9 64 89 16 5 18 69 21 69 83 1 3
6 7 81 8 43 97 59 6 6 75 7 23 90 36
7 2 83 2 41 100 00 7 8 83 9 64 100 00
N= 83 N = 83
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HISTOGRAMS
Histogram of yrsacdu N = 83
Midpoint Count
10 5 *****









Histogram of marstat N = 83







Histogram of age N = 83
i dpoi nt Count
32 3 ***
33 14 **************
34 1 1 ***********
35 13 *************
3S 14 **************






Histogram of sex N = 83
Each * represents 2 obs
Midpoint Count
1 72 ************************************
2 1 1 ******
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Histogram of likessb N = 83








Histogram of likevsi N = 83
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Histogram of rankssb N = 83





Histogram of rankvsi N * 83





Histogram of rankerp N = 83










































































































































































































































-0 041 -0 008
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients
r- ypsadu p-child p-age p-pi fppb p-spsatt p-capint p-c ivjob p-llkssb
p-child 128
p-age 478 166
r-ri fprb -0 151 -0 101 -0 013
r-spsatt -0118 -0 274 -0 243 000
r-carint -0 162 -0 045 -0 086 -0 075 -0 055
r-c ivjob 031 -0 263 -0 139 -0 160 -0 109 -0 023
p-likssb -0 025 228 049 071 -0 072 090 -0 023
r-1 lkvsi -0 159 19S -0 090 0.050 -0 070 0.289 -0 033 544
r-likerp -0 162 197 -0 114 141 -0 069 029 041 230
r -medic 1 -0 094 -0 029 -0 073 -0 1 58 278 -0 OSS -0 060 -0 126
p-comexc -0 020 -0 070 010 -0 183 101 173 029 -0 052
r- joblv -0 095 100 -0 107 -0 100 -0 126 012 094 102
r-famhsg -0 183 134 -0114 -0 034 047 -0 027 -0 129 073
r-sepcsl -0 068 -0 049 -0 060 -0 062 089 004 -0 .1 36 072
i—empast -0 131 039 -0110 -0 113 072 030 -0 220 098
r-avgl ik -0 144 229 -0 075 159 -0 064 128 012 631




-0 117 -0 212
r-comexc -0 060 -0 180 336
p- j obi
v
160 078 205 320
p- f amhsg 088 -0 143 28S 328 381
r-sepc si 191 -0 219 222 187 288 4S9
r-empast 141 -0 165 215 094 224 374 716
r-avgl ik 732 829 -0 220 -0 162 137 -0 061 -0 035 -0 023
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REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS


































































































































r eg ress c 1 4 on "7 p r ed i c tors c 2 . c 4 , c 7 , c 8 , c 1 8 , c 20 , c 2 1 :
SUBC>
residuals in c99.
The regression equation is
likeerp = 13 - 252 yrsacdu + 4.65 child - 113 age + 164 nfprob
- 332 medical + 152 jobleave - 233 famhouse
Predi c tor Coef Stdev t--ratio P
Constant 13.029 3 698 3 52 001
yrsacdu -0 2524 1535 -1 64 104
child 4655 1860 2 50 014
age -0 1 129 1057 -1 07 289
r i fprob 1636 1283 1 27 206
medi cal -0 3324 1558 -2 13 036
j obleave 1518 1388 1 .09 278
famhouse -0 2328 1215 -1 92 059
s = 1 . 858 R-sq = 21 6% R-sq< adj ) = 14 3%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE DF SS MS F P
Regression 7 71 412 10 202 2 95 009
Error 75 258 998 3 453
Total 82 330 409
SOURCE DF SEQ S3
yrsacdu 1 1 714
child 14 239
age 2 408





Obs yrsacdu 1 l keerp Fit Stdev Fit Residual St Resid
2 19 1 000 4 186 970 -3 186 -2 01R
21 12 .0 1 000 5 664 419 -4 664 -2 58R
32 13 1 000 4 780 457 -3 780 -2 10R
R denotes an ObS with a large st resid
.
plot cl4 c99
likeerp - * **22*****3 33 2**x
6 + * ** *3 %2 ** *
* 2 * 2* 2* *
4 + ** ** * 232 3 *
2 0+ * * **
* * 2* **







SOURCE OF ' SS
FACTOR 2 493.16
ERROR 246 634 . 43
TOTAL 248 1 1 27 60
MS F P
246 58 95 61 000
2 58
INDIVIDUAL 95 PCT CI'S FOR MEAN
BASED ON POOLED STDEV
LEVEL N MEAN STDEV
likessb 83 1 ,663 1 . 161
1 ikevsi 83 2.301 1 536
1 ikeerp 83 4 916 2 007















2 4 3 6 4 8















rankssb 83 1 . 1928
rankvsi 83 1 9398
rankerp 83 2.8554
POOLED STDEV - 4592
MTB >
MS F P
57 558 272 93 000
211
INDIVIDUAL 95 PCT CI'S FOR MEAN
BASED ON POOLED STDEV




— + + + + .
1 20 1 80 2 40 3 00
aovoneway c!8-c23
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
SOURCE OF SS MS
FACTOR 5 574 94 1 1 4 99
ERROR 492 1 548 55 3 15






INDIVIDUAL 95 PCT CI'S FOR MEAN
BASED ON POOLED STDEV
LEVEL N MEAN STDEV
medical 83 6 120 1 426
comm exc 83 4 735 1 747 (— t )
jobleave 83 4 470 1 692 (— *—
)
f amhouse 83 3 120 1 922 (— *-—
)
sepcouns 83 2 976 1 834 (— »---)
emplasst 83 3 735 1 970 (—*--)
(--*--)
1 774 3 6 4 8 6
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APPENDIX C
SUMMARY OF SUBJECTIVE RESPONSES
This appendix contains a summary of responses to survey
I tern 14 asking respondents to provide an explanation for
their ranking of the three separation incentive plans,
particularly the one they were most likely to accept.
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SUMMARY OF SUBJECTIVE RESPONSES
Choice is simple; 15 year retirement includes highest PV,
COLA adjustments and medical insurance Inflation will
murder VSI Health coverage critical to family's well being
until new employer covers medical costs Commissary
benefits outweigh exchange privileges which I find next to
worthless in CONUS . (003)
Monthly income and traditional retirement benefits were the
principal reasons I stayed in the military I will not
voluntarily leave without them. I have invested 16 years in
a plan that will meet the medical/etc. needs of my family
for life. I won't give it up (004)
More interested in ensuring that there would be some type of
annuity vice lump sum. With no debts, lump sum not as
urgent (005)
I feel that after at least 15 years of service a member
should be compensated for life because of the sacrifices
made while in the service (006)
Same benefits at 15 years that would've received at 20— can
retire early and move on to second career. I've done all I
wanted to do in the Navy. Time to move on (007)
Only 15 year retirement provides all benefits previously
assumed (commissary, etc.) SSB allows my control of my
financial investment of lump sum. VSI not good due to
impact of unknown inflation. (008)
The 15 year retirement would be most desirable because it
includes all benefits (medical, exchange, etc) that were
"promised" upon my original commissioning. Any reduction in
these benefits would not be acceptable. (009)
Economi cs (010)
15 year plan: I don't just want the money, I want all the
privileges that go with retirement too (golf courses,
commissary, rec activities, etc) Also money for rest of
life is OK too. VSI: good * for 20+ years is next best
SSB: stupid option (012)
At the 12 year point I find all of them undesirable To
pick the lesser of 3 evils, the 15 year retirement most
closely resembles the 20 year benefits I would be eligible 8
years from now (013)
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Dollars and benefits— 15 year retirement best in both areas
(014)
Inflation adjusted annually is best. (015)
Long term security is of great importance as are medical
benefits. (016)
The early retirement is by far the best deal because of
payments for life and commissary/exchange privileges This
is especially true considering the payments are nearly the
same as VSI but adjusted for inflation and continue for
life. VSI is second best choice because of guaranteed
income for many years. I'd choose lump sum last It would
have to be higher, at least twice, to be a consideration I
like the security of a steady paycheck I'd only consider
any of the plans if faced with prospect of being
involuntarily separated; I enjoy the Navy and hope to stay
for 20 year retirement I'd only consider 15 year
retirement if I failed to be selected for 05 or didn't like
what I was doing at the time (017)
Early retirement preferred for benefits; other 2 a tossup
.
(018)
A substantial part of our compensation is medical and
privileges. The 15 year retirement is the only plan that
addresses them beyond a kiss goodbye, and is the only one
indexed to inflation (019)
First choice would be 15 year retirement due to full
benefits and adjusted for inflation; SSB would be second to
invest in real estate (no debts to pay off); VSI last choice
as not adjusted for inflation (020)
Tax benefits of early retirement plan (021
)
I want a real retirement plan If the 15 year retirement




> year retirement that would include all benefits of
regular retirement is deciding factor, plus annuity that
would continue for life The other 2 are equally
undesirable due to lack of benefits and acceptance would
hinge on economy and tax laws at the time The SSB being
fully taxable in that year really diminishes its
desirability. (024)
15 year retirement has most benefits over longer period of
time (life) and health care. (025)
76
lb year retirement: benefits last for life VSI over SSB
due to tax consequences (027)
None of the plans are as good as 20 year retirement 15-
year retirement is only real option in terms of monetary
worth and benefits. Only advantage is getting to civilian
employment at an earlier age (late 30 ' s vice mid-40's)
(028)
The 15 year retirement with full benefits is no lose
situation if you're confident of your ability to find a job.
Either of the other options will result in a big loss
particularly when considering health care costs (029)
Tax burden of SSB would be too great The 15-year retirement
sounds best (030)
I plan on living a long time. Early retirement would work
best for me. SSB would be second since you're getting
tomorrow's money today. VSI would just help pay the
mortgage. It's short term (031)
Want steady retirement income during periods of possible
unemployment in post-Navy career (032)
15 year retirement best value, least taxes. (033)
15 year retirement is most acceptable because there's no
moral justification to pursue a career unless there's
motivation that one's country can return for the depth of
service provided to the country. To serve for an extensive
time (15-20 years) and not be recognized through retirement
opportunities is an immoral justice. . Should the economy be
so bad as to need short order terminations of service, the
15 year retirement is the only option. If that's not an
option, the lump sum is next best. This would allow an
individual to recover his life, and establish a life leading
to reasonable retirement, though short of original
expectations (035)
One of the biggest advantages of a "full" career is the
retirement benefits. 15 year retirement comes closest to
this. Otherwise upon separation I'd work elsewhere
immediately; hence a lump sum payment would not be required.
VSI is better financially than SSB. (036)
15 year early retirement provides additional benefits not
covered under the other plans Retirement and benefits are
probably the biggest reason I have not conducted job
searches during my career (037)
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Benefits and paycheck till death do us part explain the
attraction to 15 year early retirement. VSI not bad cash
wise but no benefits accompany plan Best plan is to retire
when I stop being useful to the Navy, sometime after 20
years SSB lousy for senior people, probably good for
junior guys (038)
Lump sum is taxable, lose medi cal /commissary too early. VSI
annual payments no adjusted for inflation, no benefits. 15
year retirement has annual payments adjusted for inflation
and continue for life; full traditional retirement benefits
(039)
I joined and remained in the Navy for a monthly retirement
for life. Any other arrangement is not acceptable (040)





Low rank of SSB due to tax liability. (042)
Income tax on SSB would be significant since have to claim
entire amount in one year. 15 year retirement most
desirable (043)
15 year retirement; most long term benefits. VSI next
largest benefit. SSB; foolish to even offer (044)
VSI will only cover until I'm 65 while early retirement will
go beyond Lump sum will only cover 1 year and with 3
children, that may be a gamble to find a satisfactory
profession in that time. (045)
The most important thing is maintaining commissary/exchange
and medical benefits that the 15-year retirement offers.
Without that option, if forced to choose, I'd take VSI
because I'd lose such a large chunk of SSB to taxes. VSI
would be a nice addition to the pay/benefits I think I could
command in the private sector. (046)
15 year plan gives best benefits for life, not only medical
care, commissary, etc but pay. (047)
SSB is not much, maybe a downpayment on a house VSI is
steady income until a better job can be found. 15 year
retirement is money forever (048)
I want a 20 year retirement If I can't get that, then the
15 year early retirement; if not that, then VSI because it
keeps income coming in. (049)
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15 year retirement gives benefits of retirement plus decent
monthly stipend, not enough to live on but a good start. The
SSB is enticing particularly if assured of similarly
salaried job. Although VSI gives nearly same monthly amount
as 15 year retirement, only for 30 years and no retirement
benefits. (050)
Prefer 15 year retirement due to continued benefits and
COLA. (051
)
I could make better use of SSB immediately upon leaving
Navy and preparing for new career. The 15-year retirement
is my second choice over VSI. (052)
15 year retirement same as regular retirement but less
money. SSB lump sum too large tax bite. (053)
15 year retirement offers greatest financial return. (054)
SSB has least total value, which 15 year retirement has
potential for highest value overall, plus traditional
benefits and inflation adjustment The only way you'd make
out better with SSB is if you dropped dead shortly after
leaving service (or rather your benefactors would make out)
(055)
15 year retirement a pretty good deal, since still able to
pursue other career with lifetime bennies and payments
(056)
SSB: why should I be attracted to same benefits package
awarded to those members involuntarily separated? Doesn't
adequately compensate those who have worked to be "pack +"
.
VSI: Only marginally more attractive than SSB, but without
inflation protection. Take taxes out of each payment and
ignore inflation— recipe for financial dependency 15 year
retirement: Freedom to pursue a second career earlier
somewhat compensates for deficiencies of retainer. (057)
Part of my decision to join and remain in the Navy, go
through deployments, being stationed on small islands, etc
was the benefit package that went with staying at least 20
years. I made the decision to stay, and I expect to get
those benefits. The lump sum payment is totally
unacceptable. The VSI is a better plan, but doesn't address
the key benefit issues (059)
The monthly payments with continued benefits are what I'm
working for and what I expect when I do retire (060)
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15 year retirement only plan to give medical, commissary,
etc, plus closest monetarily to 20 year plan. In reality I
think all three options are pretty poor! (061)
15 year retirement better than VSI due to benefits plus
payments for life vice fixed period of time SSB is least
attractive because less PV when compared to VSI I don't
need a lump sum. (062)
With only 5 more years to a 20 year retirement, I'd have to
have a good job prospect in order to get out first. (063)
SSB: one shot deal; should be tax free or taxed differently
VSI: No benefits is big drawback, should be indexed to
inflation over duration. 15 year retirement: most fair of
the three Health care is big issue Would take it only if
I thought I wasn't competitive for 0-5. (064)
The benefits of medical, commissary/exchange, etc are big
plus. (065)
The money is one thing but continued medical benefits are
really important—also COLA ' s . Additionally, will need long
term retirement for after age 65; that's why 15 year
retirement is best option. (066)
Too much tax bite from lump sum payment. (067)
The annual payment under VSI and 15 year retirement nearly
the same, but VSI runs out whereas retirement is for life.
Also provides benefits VSI doesn't. 15 year retirement
superior in all respects to other two choices (068)
15 year retirement most beneficial; VSI slightly less. SSB
only acceptable as alternative to having no plan (069)
Monetary benefit of 15 year retirement clearly better (070)
Retirement plan most secure of 3 plans while VSI provides
less money and no benefits. SSB is worst of all—no
benefits, massive tax debt and no inflation protection.
(071 )
SSB: taxes eat away benefit. VSI: one of military's
selling points is lifetime benefits; right when I reach
retirement age, VSI benefits stop! (072)
15 year retirement gives permanent steady stream of income
and gives full benefits. (073)
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Considering the time I've invested in the Navy, I want the
security of a retirement plan (074)
SSB; taxes, little financial security in outyears VSI : no
retirement benefits. 15 year retirement: benefits plus
guaranteed income for life. (075)
I want full retirement benefits. Service in critical areas
in order to get 5 years additional retirement credit (to
bring up to 20 years) would be good. (076)
15 year retirement plan very similar to what I joined
service for. Full privileges are very important (077)
15 year retirement pay and benefits continue for life (078)
I intend to receive lifetime annuity before moving on, no
matter how small annuity is. (079)
Would most likely accept early retirement— it's worth more
Second is VSI because in long run will benefit one more than
SSB (080)
Total value is best with early retirement. Those who take
lump sum are economically foolish. (082)
Would like to complete 20 year naval career and get annuity
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